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INTRODUCCIÓN 
Since the birth of science, humans have been fascinated by 
the world where they live. Nonetheless , even before that singular 
moment in human history, human beings were intrigued by the 
phenomena that occured in it. Questions of the what of things, 
their how and their why plagued the human mind. Marvelled 
with these questions, humans also feel fascinated by questions 
about themselves: who they are and what they are in the midst 
of the universe. 
H u m a n s in k n o w i n g the u n i v e r s e , k n o w m o r e a b o u t 
themselves. In doing science, humans k n o w that they are not 
angels nor mere apes. We k n o w that we are human beings whose 
nature is more than the nature of simians but is less than the 
nature of pure spirits. We discover then a new dimension aside 
from the material realm of the universe. We discover what reality 
is: that it is one and unique that it is not only limited to the 
material realm but also consists of the non-material dimension of 
reason. 
O n e aspect of reality is certainly the material realm and 
humans k n o w it through science. However , in doing science, 
humans take for granted some presuppositions that fall beyond its 
s c o p e . T h e r e exist s o m e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , p h i l o s o p h i c a l and 
theological, in science without which science would be an impossi-
ble under tak ing . M a n y authors affirm these p re suppos i t ions . 
Stanley Jaki is one of them. 
Stanley Jak i , a Catholic priest with doctorates in theology 
and in physics, argues the existence of presuppositions in science. 
Taking a look at history, in particular at the history of science, 
he tries to derive some conclusions as regards to the nature of 
science. H e believes that the history of science offers an objec-
tive ground to study the nature of science. Thus , it is through 
history that he proves the existence of these presuppositions on 
science. In particular, he points out the failure of science to thrive 
into existence in antiquity and its viable birth during the Mid-
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die Ages thanks to the Christian doctrine of creation as proofs of 
his claim. 
M a n y of the publications of Stanley Jaki deal about faith 
and reason relat ionship. In these w o r k s , one finds abundant 
references about these philosophical and theological presupposi-
tions in science. O n e of these presuppositions is the creation of 
the universe by G o d and its intelligibility. This presupposit ion 
which may be called the ontological presupposit ion of science im-
plies the affirmation of G o d as the Creator of the universe w h o 
is not only its Ult imate Cause but is also its Ult imate Intelligi-
bility. 
The ontological presupposit ion of science is the topic of 
discussion in the following pages of this excerpt of the doctoral 
dissertation. Aside from this discussion, the following are also in-
cluded: 1) the contents of the thesis, 2) abbreviations used, 3) the 
bibliography, and 4) the contents of the excerpt. 
I would like to extend m y deepest and sincere gratitude to 
Prof. D r . Ja ime N u b i o l a for all the valuable help he has rendered 
to me in writing the doctoral dissertation from where these pages 
are extracted. I also give thanks especially to Prof. Dr . Mariano 
Artigas for the intellectual encouragement he has given me and 
finally, to the Fundación R O D E for the financial support I have 
received from them. 
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THE UNIVERSE AS A CREATION 
THE ONTOLOGICAL 
PRESUPPOSITION OF SCIENCE 
«What is my God? I put the question to the earth. It answered, 
7 am not God,' and all things on earth declared the same (...) I spoke 
to all the things that are about me, all that can be admitted by the 
door of the senses, and I said, 'Since you are not my God, tell me 
about Him. Tell me something of my God.' Clear and loud they 
answered, 'God is He who made us.'» (St. Augustine, Confession, 
Book X) 
Science, faith and phi losophy are mutually intertwined in 
the thoughts of Stanley Jaki . Being distinct from one another, 
each has a specific scope and yet all point out to one and the 
same reality. A harmony of knowledge exists among them and a 
certain continuity can be traced that serves as a link with each 
one of them. 
Science in its attempt to know the material reality relies on 
some truths that fall beyond its scope. It presupposes these truths 
in its undertaking. These presupposit ions are mainly philosophical, 
or more specifically, metaphysical . S o m e are ontological ; the 
others, gnoseological. These philosophical presuppositions lead to 
a truth that can be said to be absolutely beyond science but is 
within the range of human reason. This truth is the existence of 
G o d w h o , under the light of science and phi losophy, is recogniz-
ed to be the Ult imate Intelligibility of the created universe being 
its Creator. These presuppositions of science may be said to be a 
link that can be established between science and phi losophy and 
between science and faith. 
«Presupposit ion» is the nominative form of the verb «to 
presuppose». T o presuppose can have the following meanings: «1) 
to suppose, lay down, or postulate beforehand; hence, to take for 
468 NOEL Ma. N. VILLAJIN 
granted or assume beforehand or to start with; to presume, 2) to 
s u p p o s e a p r i o r i , to t h i n k or bel ieve in advance of actual 
knowledge or experience, or 3) to require as a necessary preceding 
condition; to involve or imply as an antecedent . * 1 A presupposi-
tion therefore is that which is assumed as a basis of argument, ac-
tion or s imply a preliminary assumption. T o affirm that science 
relies on some presuppositions means that science is not a self-
explainable body of knowledge and that it requires for its full ex-
p lanat ion s o m e t ruths a s sumed beforehand. T h e s e t ruths lie 
beyond its scope and are not dealt with therefore in science and 
yet they should be considered in it since they constitute its very 
foundations. 
l. S C I E N C E A N D T H E I N T E L L I G I B I L I T Y O F T H E U N I V E R S E 
Science is a knowledge of the universe. T h o u g h it may be 
surprising, science did not immediately exist when humans en-
countered p h e n o m e n a that marvel led their inquis i t ive mind . 
Science only started much later during the Middle Ages when 
h u m a n s grasped the no t ion of the full intel l igibi l i ty of the 
universe and when this notion had been fully integrated in human 
culture. This is what Stanley Jak i believes on. A s what will be 
seen in the discussion, the intelligibility of the universe can only 
be achieved by affirming an ultimate intelligibility that transcends 
it. This , in other words , means the affirmation of the contingency 
of the universe and the fact of creation. 
1.1. Creation ex nihilo and the birth of science 
Ancient science achieved remarkable scientific feats in the 
antiquity. T h r o u g h curiosity, humans acquired abundant ideas 
about the universe based on the phenomena that were observed 
and the changes that occurred in it. Some of these ideas were in-
deed scientific discoveries. Yet , in these ancient discoveries, a par-
tial aspect of the universe was grasped by ancient thinkers. What 
started as a mere curiosity for them on the nature of the universe 
led to those discoveries that, in a certain way, answered that urge 
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to k n o w the how and the w h y of things. Nevertheless, as history 
shows and what Jaki claims, science failed to reach that stage of 
a self-sustaining enterprise. H e noted the scientific stillbirths in the 
ant iqui ty in spite of s o m e evidences of scientif ic ingenui ty 
especially in the Greek culture. 
T h e principal , and the m o r e radical, reason for such a 
failure according to Jaki was a misconception of the universe, that 
is to say, a philosophical-theological error of attributing eternal 
cycles in the universe. H e noted that this is a c o m m o n trait of 
all ancient thoughts . H e remarks : « T h e cycle (...) represented 
nature not as an inspiration but as a fearsome curse. In India and 
China of old the connection between the gradual withering of 
science and the ascendancy of belief in eternal recurrence stands 
out in bold relief. The same is also plausible clear in the cultures 
of the pyramids , the Egyptian, the Babylonian, and the Maya. 
The evidence for the same in ancient Greece and among Musl im 
Arabs has its special instructiveness for any historian of Western 
science.» 2 
F r o m this perspective of reality, an insurmountable obstacle 
had been introduced in the early scientific endeavor in the anti-
quity. T o affirm eternal returns in the universe is tantamount to 
an infinite regress of causality in it. In this panorama, no ultimate 
causality, and no ultimate intellegibility for that matter, can be 
reached. The universe would not be fully intelligible because its 
intelligibility is bound up with an infinite regress of intelligibility. 
Though full intelligibility, the knowledge of the ultimate in-
tellegibility, cannot be attained in an eternal cyclic universe, 
necessity can be attributed to it. T h e perpetual cycles occur 
necessarily. All processes in the entire universe occur necessarily 
that they would have to occur again and again in successive 
stages. The universe in the antiquity was taken as necessary, a 
trait opposed to contingency. A necessary universe can only be 
what it is, what it was and what it will be. A necessary universe 
at this view was also eternal. This was the dominant conception 
of the universe in the antiquity and which according to J ak i was 
the reason for the failure of science in that period of t ime. 
Ancient thought then is, in a certain way, bound with a 
pantheistic notion of the universe insofar as the universe was con-
sidered as necessary. Necessity was needed by the ancient thinkers 
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to provide the base for their inquiries and satisfy the human urge 
to know the universe. They realized that knowledge and truth 
had to be rooted in necessity. If such were not the case, no true 
knowledge could be achieved and that no truth could ever exist. 
However , lacking with the notion of a personal Creator, the 
Necessary Being in Itself, the universe, according to Jaki , was con-
sidered in the antiquity as being necessary and divine. This may 
not be explicit among the ancient philosophers. In fact, all of 
them seemed to make a distinction between the divine and the 
sensible beings. Nevertheless, it is certain that they failed to see 
the contingency of the universe and with the organismic thought 
prevailing during that t ime, the universe was viewed as necessary. 
A n eternal recurrence of all generic things and processes was at-
tributed to it and as a consequence, its form of intelligibility was 
necessary as well. Being eternal and necessary, the full rationality 
of the universe was impaired. N o ultimate intelligibility could be 
reached and according to Jaki , science could not possibly thrive at 
this situation as what history attests in the antiquity. 
Jaki writes on the failure of Greek thought in science as 
follows: «But since creation was the act of a rational Creator , the 
work of creation had to be fully consistent, that is, rational. (...) 
This is why science implies much more than the Greek way of 
looking at the world, a way which, however rational as long as 
it dealt with the abstractions of geometry , was not rational 
enough when it came to physical reality. In the end it became the 
prisoner of an irrationality which barred access to the novelty of 
a self-sustaining science, the only science worthy of its n a m e . » 3 
The Greeks were rational enough but their rationality was 
not adequate in terms of the physical reality. Thus , Jaki affirms 
that the Greek way of looking at the world as organismic was 
not adequate. More has to be said about a universe that is govern-
ed by purpose. It is certain that it is imbued with purpose but 
still one has to go on further. J ak i is of the opinion that one 
should affirm its rationality and this could only be affirmed if 
there is a rational being that serves as its ultimate intelligibility. 
Science could only be possible if full rationality of the universe 
could be achieved. This implies an ultimate intelligibility which 
could not be none other than G o d w h o created the universe and 
infused in it an intelligibility. 
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The Greek organismic thought only reached the intelligibili-
ty of the universe in terms of purpose but it failed to attribute 
full intelligibility to the universe. In an eternal cycle, an ultimate 
intelligibility is left out. F o r this reason, Jaki writes: «If there was 
to be a science of nature, then nature had to be liberated from 
all remnants of animism (...) An imi sm, which was always an 
essential feature of pantheism, was no match in the long run at 
least, for the impetus of the doctrine of creation when the doc-
trine was taken in terms of the N e w Tes tament . » 4 
The Christian doctrine of creation played a dominant role 
in the birth of science. Its teachings invoke a rational Creator of 
the universe w h o being its Ult imate Cause is also its Ult imate In-
telligibility. Affirming an ultimate intelligibility, it is affirmed as 
well the full intelligibility of the universe and the possibility to 
know it and do science. 
The doctrine of creation offers to science the intelligibility 
of the universe and its contingency. The universe does not have 
to be necessary in order to be k n o w n as what the ancient 
thinkers believed on. Being organismic, the Greeks struggled 'to 
save purpose ' but, in the process, failed ' to save the phenomena' . 
It was an effort to rally for purpose against the Presocratic 
mechanistic thought but it went too far beyond its limits. T h e 
Greek organismic thought led to a certain apriorism and a certain 
downgrading of the need for observation, that is, to look at reali-
ty at its brute facts, to experiment on them and to verify the 
results with reality. Jaki writes: «The sense of purpose , which is 
immediately evidenced through introspection, became, through its 
unwarranted generalization by Socarates, an invitation to reach 
truth through introspective mentation, the gist of apriorism and 
the worst pitfall offered by log ic . » 5 
Aristotle's organismic physics, as seen by Jaki , is partially 
aprioristic and subjective science because it is about purpose. In 
fact, it is all about purpose. It is panteleology. H e affirms this as 
follows: «Being a projection of man's nature into the external 
world, the organismic physics as developed by Aristotle's physics 
is not a depersonalized analysis of the world but rather a subjec-
tive penetration of nature. Its parameters are those of the realm 
of human volition: natural, unnatural, violent, or restful .» 6 F r o m 
panteleologism, apriorism or subjectivism comes as a consequence. 
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All that matters is purpose and knowing it as one knows the 
nature of things, empirical observations and the need for ex-
perimentations are left out and fall into redundancy. All that is 
needed is intuition as J ak i writes: «Its (science's) scope is not to 
find the correlation of things, but to achieve an intuitive insight 
into the nature of things, into their alleged strivings and affec-
tions. This is w h y in an organismic physics there is no place for 
mathemat i c s , m e a s u r e m e n t , or e x p e r i m e n t s ; and quant i ta t ive 
results can never negate the qualitative conclus ions . * 7 
It is important to take note that the Greeks were not 
aprioristic or subjective in the modern sense of the w o r d . 8 What 
Jaki seems to claim here is that the Greeks made speculations 
about the universe without sufficient basis on reality. It was an 
overconfidence on intuition more than on empirical observations. 
It is a subjective a priori penetration of nature without paying 
enough attention to reality. 
Jaki writes on the failure of the Greeks to observe reality 
adequately. H e says: «The idea of creation out of nothing was re-
jected by all who were known as dogmatists in late antiquity, 
namely, the Aristotelians, the Atomist s and the Stoics. (...) T h e 
ways constructed by any of the dogmatic schools to reach G o d , 
that is, the ultimate in intelligibility and being, did not lead to 
anything transcending the world (...) With no transcendent in-
tellect emerging on the horizon, with the world proved to be 
without intellect, all that remained was to fall back on the human 
mind, for which nothing was more natural than to settle with the 
customary. Such a mind could hardly be alert to deeper perspec-
tives, to patterns of intelligibility very different f rom those it was 
accustomed t o . » 9 
The empirical data gathered by the Greeks were limited 
then according to Jaki only to the customary. It is another conse-
quence of their view of the universe as necessary which only ad-
mits a one to one correspondence between the changes in the 
natural processes and the purposes to where they are directed at 
as what has been noted earlier. It is under this context that the 
Greeks were not that realists and resorted to a certain apriorism 
in their attempt to know the universe. They took for granted the 
customary empirical data as something necessary. N o r o o m was 
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left for other possibilities, or other 'status naturae' St. Thomas 
talked about in a contingent created universe.1 0 
Sanguineti also notices the a priorism and the failure of em-
pirical data in Greek science and affirms that the Christian doc-
trine of creation issued back the importance of empirical observa-
tions and facts in science. He says: «The Christian doctrine of the 
Creation contributed indirectly to put an end in the crisis of the 
Greek cosmology and with this revolutionized science. It em-
phasized the need for empirical investigations in science as if it 
were able to exclaim: let us not start from too much presupposi-
tions and observe more the facts.* 1 1 
Jaki also affirms: «...creative science always presupposes, im-
plicitly or explicitly, a world view which is anchored in the 
Christian dogma of creation. Science is possible only if the 
universe is both rational, that is, intelligible, and is also created, 
that is, contingent, and therefore to be understood through em-
pirical investigations that exclude an a priori approach.* 1 2 
The Christian doctrine of creation affirmed the importance 
of empirical investigations for science. As Jaki writes: «...the very 
existence of a science that wants to retain empirical basis is based 
on the contingency of any and all. Otherwise there would be no 
need of laboratories and observatories but only of a priori 
minds.» 1 3 Intuition or a apriori approach may certainly play a 
role in doing science but one cannot remain in it as such. Science 
has to look at reality and demonstrate whether the facts of reality 
correspond to the ideas of the universe. Success in science implies 
a harmony or correspondence between empirical investigations 
and intuition. 
Summarizing what has been discussed above, we have the 
following ideas. The necessary character of ancient thought is 
ultimately rooted in its organismic thought. One consequence is a 
priorism or subjectivism and an overconfidence on intuition more 
than on empirical observations. Purpose was attributed to 
everything and it was seen to be infallible and necessary. This is 
certain though but what it failed to reach was that the purpose 
in reality is not necessary in itself but in another. This necessity 
in another was laid down by the Christian teaching of the doc-
trine of creation which was not present in ancient thought. The 
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Christian faith advocates a contingent universe insofar as it is 
necessary in another and depends ultimately on its Creator. 
F r o m this novel view of the universe as contingent, an 
ultimate intelligibility is attributed for the universe which is also 
its ultimate causality, its Creator, who transcends it but is within 
the reach of the human mind. The human mind in its search for 
the knowledge of the universe sees in G o d the ult imate in-
telligibility and affirms a contingent universe that has its reason in 
its u l t imate cause. A s J a k i writes : « T h e cont ingency of the 
universe as a whole serves as a pointer to an ultimate intelligibili-
ty which though outside the universe in a metaphysical sense, is 
within the inferential power of man's intel lect . * 1 4 The ultimate 
intelligibility of the universe provides for the human mind the 
assurance that the universe is indeed intelligible. T h e universe is 
intelligible for there is an ultimate intelligibility. It is for this 
reason that ancient science failed. Their conception of the universe 
as eternal returns, that is, as necessary, resulted to an abortive ef-
fect on science: apriorism and its consequent downgrading of e m : 
pirical investigations. 1 5 
Science and creation are closely linked in Jaki ' s thought s . 1 6 
As what has been mentioned, science has its origin in the belief 
of the rationality of the universe. That rationality in the universe 
is rooted metaphysically in its contingency. The universe is con-
tingent because it has its ultimate intelligibility not in itself but 
in another. If such were not the case, one falls into an infinite 
regress in the knowledge of the universe where no ultimate in-
telligibility can be talked about. It would be a universe that is not 
fully intelligible. A consequence of this would be the impossibility 
to aim at the knowledge of the universe and to do science. 1 7 
O n the contrary, a contingent universe necessarily implies 
an ultimate intelligibility. In this set-up, it fosters that human urge 
to seek for the knowledge of causality until one takes that leap 
towards that ultimate causality or intelligibility of the universe 
and affirms the contingent existence of the universe. The former 
is to do science; the latter, metaphysics . 1 8 
Taking that step to metaphysics —affirming an ultimate in-
telligibility distinct from the universe— provides that assurance for 
the human mind to know not only isolated events or causalities 
in the universe but to know as well the universe in its totality, 
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that is, a physical reality where all causalities are mutually related 
with one another. This assurance can only arise if there is such 
ultimate intelligibility in the universe, that is, if the universe is ac-
cepted to be contingent. 
A contingent universe can only be contingent if there is a 
necessary being distinct f rom it. T h e universe is contingent 
because there is a necessary Being distinct from it who created it. 
O r in other words , it is contingent because it is a creation of a 
personal C r e a t o r . J a k i wri tes : « N o w if the universe is not 
necessary, that is, is not necessarily what it is, then it is con-
tingent. If, however, it is contingent, its actual shape and its very 
existence are dependent on a choice which transcends the entire 
universe. That choice or power can only be the creative om-
nipotence of G o d . Such is the chain of events of reasoning which 
show that man's science is not only a view of the universe but 
also a view of creation and that ultimately we have to begin with 
G o d . » 1 9 
Only by considering its Creator, the necessity in Itself, can 
one see the universe as contingent and as fully intelligible. It is 
of interest then for science to affirm the doctrine of creation, not 
to study it which falls beyond its competence, but to recognize it. 
T o talk of creation is to talk of a Creator. O n e is the thing 
created and the other is the O n e who creates. O n e is not the 
other as what emanationists or pantheists believe on, that the 
created reality is of the essence of the Creator and is therefore 
identical with the Creator himself. Another error would be to 
look at creation as an independent reality f rom its Crea tor 
separating the two realities completely once creation has taken 
place. This view is called deism. 
These views of creation are incompatible with science which 
has been described above. Emanat ionism is, in the long run, pan-
theism; an affirmation of a necessary universe that denies the in-
telligibility of the universe and has been the obstacle for science 
to arise in the antiquity. Dei sm, on one hand, also fails in the 
point of view of phi losophy of science. A total separation bet-
ween creation and its Creator is untenable considering that only 
in view of the Creator can the ultimate intelligibility of creation 
be attained. It is clear, therefore, that a different notion of crea-
tion has to be considered. 
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A rationalist view of the universe, that which considers the 
universe as a creation of the subjective mind, is seen to be uns-
cientific as well. T h e universe is considered as a projection of 
some a priori principles outside of the human mind. Everything 
in the universe at this rationalist view is a priori : its existence, its 
intelligibility, the causalities that occur in it, the phenomena that 
can be observed in it, etc. Everything in the universe is given by 
the subjective mind. It is given but it could not be said to be fac-
tual, objective and real. It is a universe that is non-contingent. It 
is rooted in a priori principles that are said to be necessary. In 
effect, it denies the contingency of the universe. A s a conse-
quence, just like in the case of emanationism and deism, no 
ultimate intelligibility of the universe can be known and the 
universe cannot be fully intelligible. 
What science calls for is a creation that looks at the full in-
telligibility of the universe. It is a notion of creation that is not 
present in the views mentioned above but it is truly reflected in 
the Christian faith —a creation ex nihilo— contained in its creed: 
«1 believe in G o d , the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and 
earth.» and is constantly affirmed in its teachings . 2 0 
O n l y a creation ex nihilo can truly reflect the origin of true 
science. This notion of creation implies a personal, free and ra-
tional Creator, w h o creates out of nothing with H i s infinite O m -
nipotence a universe by endowing its existence, or the act of be-
ing, and conserves that act of being by H i s Divine Providence . 2 1 
A true creation can only be a creation from nothing. If G o d 
is taken as the «Ipsum Esse Subsistens», as it is known through 
revelation, it is only natural to affirm that all creation, distinct 
from its Creator, can only be existents, or beings, not by itself 
but by another. G o d creates by imparting the act of being but H e 
also creates in a very specific manner to impart the nature or 
essence that delimits the act of being into a concrete and specific 
created reality. All creation, in the strict sense of the word, can 
be said to have these two co-principles: the esse or the act of be-
ing and the essence or the manner of being. O n l y the Creator is 
pure act of being, the «Ipsum Esse Subsistens». O n l y the pure act 
of being, G o d , existed before the moment of creation. Aside from 
H i m , there was nothing and H e created from nothing. G o d 
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created the universe by endowing to it the act of being and the 
manner of being out of nothing. 
In the philosophical discussion of the notion of creation ex 
nihilo and its role in philosophy, St. Thomas Aquinas played a 
major role in it. 2 2 He, who reconciled faith and reason in his 
philosophy, noted time and again that Christian philosophy rests 
on a notion of reality which derives from the doctrine of creation 
out of nothing. Though he could never be accused of being a 
fideist, according to Jaki, St. Thomas has the opinion that the 
creation of the world in time could only be known through faith 
(revelation) and not by philosophy. In spite of the «rationalism» 
of Scholasticism in matters of Christian faith, he refused to be 
carried away to conclude that the temporality of the universe can 
be demonstrated by reason. 2 3 
Jaki moreover declares that the notion of creation ex nihilo 
does not only belong to faith. The natural light of reason can 
reach on the knowledge of God as the Creator by means of the 
created reality. Indeed, the fact of creation is a Christian dogma. 
It is not only because that this doctrine has been universally 
known through Christianity but also because it is closely linked 
with the truths preached by the Christian faith especially that of 
the Incarnation. As Jaki writes: «To call that dogma Christian just 
because it became universally known and widely shared through 
the spread of Christianity, is a failure to see beneath the surface. 
Christianity was able to carry this dogma far and wide only 
through the strength provided by faith in the Incarnation. Not 
surprisingly, it is again the dogma of the Incarnation which 
helped christians to unfold the full meaning of the dogma of crea-
tion by vindicating the true nature and dignity of created minds 
in the cosmos.» 2 4 
In another occasion, Jaki affirms the relationship between 
the doctrine of creation and other Christian truths. He says: 
«Creator, God Incarnate, creation out of nothing, immortal soul 
and human dignity are notions that form a closely knit unit, a 
fact well attested by the dogma of creation.* 2 5 
Christianity and creation for Jaki are therefore very much 
related with one another. The doctrine of creation acquires its full 
sense under the light of the dogma of the Incarnation in the per-
son of Jesus Christ, the second Person of the Blessed Trinity 
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made man. The Incarnation sheds light to the immortality of the hu-
man soul, to the human dignity to know himself, the created reality 
and the Creator of all. H e writes: «It is still to gain broad awareness 
that without the dogma of Incarnation, according to which only 
the Son is begotten and therefore the world cannot be a begetting 
or an eternal, necessary part of G o d , the dogma of Creation out 
of nothing would have lost much of its incisiveness.» 2 6 
Christianity and creation, science and creation, with this Jaki 
ventures as well as to establish the connection between Christian 
faith and science. By virtue of creation ex nihilo, that is, by vir-
tue of the contingency of the created universe and its affirmation, 
science arose and prospered. T h e chain of consequences that have 
been reached so far in this discussion goes like this: science —-full 
rationality of the universe-contingency of the universe— and final-
ly, creation ex nihilo. This is the view Stanley Jaki has of science 
and of the universe. 
Creation ex nihilo provides all the ingredients for science 
—the contingency of the universe, its ultimate intelligibility in G o d , 
its Creator, as well as its intelligibility of the causalities that occur 
in it, the order, the purpose etc. Thus, if creation does serve science 
right, it can only be creation ex nihilo and not the notion of crea-
tion adopted by emanationists, pantheists, deists or rationalists. 
Sanguineti describes this new vision of science, a science that 
looks at the doctrine of creation, as follows: «The new scientific 
world (...) is not based on physical principles immanent from the 
world but on the Creator, on His Omnipotence whose limit con-
sists of the principle of non-contradiction in such a way that 
something that is non-contradictory can also be said to be possi-
b l e . * 2 7 With this text, Sanguineti affirms the contingency of the 
universe and its relationship with science. 
T o affirm G o d as Creator of the universe, one does not fall 
into the trap of necessitarianism. T h e universe could certainly be 
said to be necessary for being only a creation, its necessity is not 
in itself but in another . 2 8 In other words , the universe can only 
be contingent and being contingent, if it has G o d for its ultimate 
cause and ultimate intelligibility. At this panorama, the universe is 
considered as perfectly intelligible. It was at this atmosphere in 
which science was born. 
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Before leaving this discussion on creation ex nihilo, it is 
deemed necessary to affirm the grandeur and significance of this 
truth. Jaki expresses this as follows: «About the act of creation 
one can meaningfully focus on its factuality, namely, that it hap-
pened, that it is an act whereby things that did not exist began 
to exist. This in a sense is not much. The doctrine of creation out 
of nothing is possible the starkest of all doctrines. It is like a huge 
infinite gap of which only the ramparts or edges can be seen. But 
those edges put us in contact with the infinite chasm of mere 
nothing on whose edge perches our puny existence, a gratuitous 
drop from the infinite richness of G o d ' s existence that alone can 
arch over the infinite abyss of non-exi s tence .» 2 9 N o t all may 
realize and be impressed with the truth of creation. Some may 
even deny it. But for J ak i it occupies a very prominent figure in 
his thoughts. 
1.2. The existence and intelligibility of the created universe 
It has been said of science that it should know, at least, it 
should admit a certain grasp of the full intelligibility of the 
universe and only in such intellectual ambience that science was 
born and has grown to maturity. It is the purpose of this section 
now to discuss the full intelligibility of the universe in science 
which Jaki calls for and what it means for this human undertak-
ing to know the universe. 
Jaki affirms: «...true science was to provide full intelligibility 
about nature, and full intelligibility meant an insight into the cause 
and purpose of everything that existed and happened.^ It has been 
mentioned in the preceding sections that to admit full intelligibili-
ty of the universe is tantamount to attribute to it an ultimate in-
telligibility. T o talk of an ultimate intelligibility in the knowledge 
of the universe entails a step beyond science. It is a step that leads 
to the affirmation of the existence of G o d and the fact of creation 
of the universe. Jaki considers that this step was indispensable for 
the birth of science and was the main reason why science failed 
to thrive in antiquity in spite that it came into existence during 
that period. 
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A s it has been cited above from Jak i , full intelligibility has 
to reach everything that existed and happened, or in other words , 
it has to reach the totality. Full intelligibility then implies a con-
sideration of the totality of the universe. The intelligibility of 
science is not only limited to a certain aspect of the universe but, 
on the other hand, it has to consider the organic teleological 
whole which Aristotle talked about in his organismic view of the 
universe but in a different sense. T h e purpose now is to discuss 
further the totality of the universe with regard to its full in-
telligibility. 
T h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the t o t a l i t y o f the u n i v e r s e is 
something prerequisite for science in Jaki ' s thoughts. It is only 
under the light of the totality of the universe that full intelligibili-
ty can be attributed to the universe. A s what has been discussed 
in the previous section, J ak i claims that science was born thanks 
to the Christian faith that provided for it the full intelligibility, 
that is, the ultimate intelligibility that serves as the foundation for 
the intelligibility of the universe. This conclusion could only be 
reached if the totality of the universe is considered. T o affirm an 
u l t imate intel l igibi l i ty of the universe is to at tr ibute an in-
telligibility for every created reality in it, that is, for the totality 
of the universe. O n the contrary, to talk of full intelligibility 
would not make sense. J ak i writes on this and contradicts Kant 
who denies the totality of the universe: «The validity of scientific 
cosmology implied the validity of our notion of the universe as 
the totaltiy of all material entities interacting with one another 
(...) This had to be a deadly blow at Kant ' s hollowed claim that 
our notion of the totality of things, or the universe, was not valid 
knowledge —the claim of Kant based from his contention that there 
is no way to G o d starting from the universe was re l iable . * 3 1 
The universe is a totality of mutually interrelated causalities 
in the physical reality. However , the totality of the universe is 
not merely the collection or set of all elements that comprise the 
universe. T h o u g h the universe can be said to be finite, one cannot 
still reduce the totality of the universe to a mere conglomeration 
of all the physical reality. It is much more than that. T h e notion 
of totality is not sensible. It is a metaphysical notion and is not 
limited with quantity. Sanguineti affirms this. H e writes: «...the 
notion of the totality is intelligible since it is a metaphysical no-
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tion and not only a logical-mathematical notion. The notion of 
the totality of the physical reality, that is, the idea of the universe 
is also metaphysical.*3 2 
The totality or the full intelligibility of the universe in 
science cannot be derived from science itself. It is only presuppos-
ed, that is, taken for granted. It is derived from philosophy, a 
more radical knowledge of reality and from theology, still a more 
radical knowledge of reality than science and philosophy. 
Sanguined states: «Philosophy (a creationist metaphysics) does not 
offer us the particular details and the specific principles of all 
things but it assures us a vision of an ultimate and genuine 
totality.* 3 3 
The totality of the universe is therefore more than a 
physical totality. It lies beyond the physical realm. Ultimately, the 
totality of the universe in the thoughts of Stanley Jaki does not 
only consist of the physical realm but in a 'queer' way, opens the 
door to the metaphysical realm that reaches one to affirm the no-
tion of God as the Ultimate Cause and Intelligibility of the 
universe. Affirming God as the Creator of the universe is to af-
firm its creation, that is, its existence. The totality then of the 
universe implies the existence of every created reality in it. The 
universe exists. It is only then that one can talk of the totality 
of the universe. Something that does not exist is certainly not of 
the universe. Only if it exists physically does it pertain to the 
universe. 
The existence of the universe is the totality of the universe. 
It is in this sense that the idea of the universe, the totality of the 
physical reality, is a metaphysical notion. The idea of the universe 
as a totality implies its existence, that is, God in creating the 
universe constitutes it as a totality first and foremost with its ex-
istence and secondly, with the specificity and order He bestowed 
to it. 
Full intelligibility as an insight into the cause and purpose 
of everything that existed and happened implies then the totality 
of the universe which consists primarily of its real existence. A 
deduction that can be made therefore is the following: the full in-
telligibility of the universe, that which science can and should af-
firm, is that reality exists. This can be restated as follows: the full 
intelligibility of the universe in science lies on the ontological 
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knowledge of reality. T h e knowledge of the existence of the 
universe constitutes the knowledge of the universe in its totality, 
in its full intelligibility. Full intelligibility of the universe implies 
knowledge of its existence. 
Ye t , it is an existence that is real and object ive . T h e 
universe exists not by itself but by another because it is a creation 
of G o d . T h e existence that the universe has is only contingent. In 
effect, the universe is fully intelligible because it is known that it 
exists and it exists not in itself but because it exists through 
another being. It is a creation of G o d . 
Full intelligibility of the universe for J ak i therefore is, in the 
first place, a pointer to the existence of G o d w h o has created the 
universe. O n l y then can one affirm that the real existence of reali-
ty constitutes the knowledge of the universe in its totality. G o d 
as the Creator is the Ult imate Cause and Intelligibility of the 
universe. O n l y then come the existence of the universe as a crea-
tion, its totality and its full-intelligibility. A t any rate, one points 
out to the other. A s J ak i comments : «...the recognition by the 
human mind of the existence of the Creator by means of created 
things implies a philosophical framework which makes no sense 
unless there is a totality of things, real, orderly and contingent, 
which is the notion of a universe proclaimed by the dogma of 
creation and claimed by science as w e l l . » 3 4 
Totality, universe, contingency, creation, G o d and full in-
telligibility in science point out to some presuppositions that lie 
beyond science. These presupposit ions are essential for science as 
what Jaki claims. Full intelligibility of the universe in science 
points out to the presence of some presupposit ions —philosophical 
and theological— that exceed the scope of sc ience. 3 5 
O n e such presupposit ion is the existence of the universe, a 
philosophical notion, that serves as the metaphysical presupposi-
tion for science; a presupposit ion which, in its turn, is rooted in 
theology, on the doctrine of creation. Science is only possible if 
the universe is intelligible, not only in its partial causality or 
essentiality, but also intelligible in its totality, that is, in its ex-
istence. O n l y with the grasp of the totality of the universe, the 
knowledge of its existence, can one have a knowledge of the 
universe and can do science. T o k n o w only the aspects of causali-
ty —its why and its how— fails to constitute science. 
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O n one hand, to affirm science one has to affirm not only 
the intelligibility of the universe but also its full intelligibility that 
ultimately consists of affirming its existence and the affirmation of 
a Creator, its Ult imate Cause and Ult imate Intelligibility. It is for 
this reason that the intelligibility of the universe can only be seen 
under the perspective of the totality that, aside from affirming the 
existence of the universe, has to take into account its contingent 
character. This then leads to the doctrine of creation, a theological 
presupposition provided by the Christian faith. 
T h e affirmation of existence of the universe is necessary in 
science for J ak i that only a realist notion of the universe, that is, 
an existence that is objective and contingent can benefit human 
beings. H e remarks: «.. .no cosmologist can live without a realist 
notion of the universe as the totality of all interacting things (...) 
It is therefore most illogical to espouse science and at the same 
time avoid facing a fundamental question about the existence of 
the w o r l d . » 3 6 
Science then is heavily loaded with philosophy. But in the 
final analysis, it is likewise loaded with theology. A s J ak i remarks: 
«.. .man's science is not only a view of the universe but also a 
view of creation and that ult imately w e have to begin with 
G o d . » 3 7 Sanguineti also writes: «What allows that the universe, 
human beings, the entire history be k n o w n is G o d , the Creator 
of the essences of things and of history. This means that humans 
can certainly k n o w the entire universe in a radical manner but 
not in an exhaustive m a n n e r . * 3 8 
Science relies therefore on these presupposit ions and this is 
true only if one considers the full intelligibility of the universe. 
This implies that humans do science in a limited manner, or in 
other words , science is not absolute. T o rely o n some presupposi-
tions is indicative that science is only limited. 
Science is not an absolute knowledge of reality. Science 
though a particular knowledge of the universe is founded on the 
notion of the totality of the universe provided by phi losophy and, 
ultimately, b y faith. It has to consider the totality although it falls 
b e y o n d its s c o p e . T h i s is a f f irmed by Sanguinet i . H e even 
observes that present epistemology also calls for it. H e writes: «At 
the present epistemology, there exists a holistic necessity that 
484 NOEL Ma. N. VIIXAJIN 
determines the truth of the sciences: if the totality is not known, 
nothing is known with certainty.»3 9 
This does not mean though that the truth of the sciences 
demand an exhaustive knowledge of the universe. What it calls for 
is that science cannot totally know the universe. It is a particular 
knowledge of the universe and it has to rely on faith and 
philosophy on some of its presuppositions. Only then science can 
be achieved and the totality which true science aims at as what 
Jaki proposes. 
From this, one may finally deduce that the full intelligibility 
of the universe is an invitation to look at the unity and harmony 
of knowledge, that is, science, faith and philosophy are mutually 
related with one another that though being distinct from one 
another, there exists a harmony and continuity in them. Science 
is a limited knowledge of reality but it relies on some presupposi-
tions —philosophical and theological— that provide for it a true 
knowledge of the universe, a full intelligibility of the universe as 
what Jaki calls for. 
Science does not have to be an exhaustive knowledge of 
reality so that it can be considered scientific. On the contrary, it 
has to recognize its limitations: that it relies on some presupposi-
tions that lie beyond its scope. Science is limited because by its 
very nature it deals only with the physical realm which is only 
an aspect of reality. There exist as well other aspects of reality 
that are not within the physical realm and therefore fall beyond 
science. These non-physical aspects of reality are properly dealt 
with in philosophy and in theology. Faith and philosophy con-
sider a more transcendent reality than the material and physical 
reality. They do so however without separating from science, that 
is, always in consideration of the physical reality. It is in this 
sense that a continuity exists in the knowledge of reality. 
Science, faith and philosophy are distinct dimensions of 
knowing reality. There exists a closely linked relationship between 
them but one cannot confuse one from the other. One can cor-
rectly affirm that each one is limited and is not absolute in its 
comprehension of reality. It is certain though that one can be 
considered a more comprehensive knowledge of reality than the 
other but not any of them can claim absolute comprehension of 
reality. One relies on the other to know reality in its totality. 
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Each one has its scope although, having its own scope, it does not 
impede that each one is mutually related with one another. Being 
distinct is not incompatible with continuity and harmony in the 
knowledge of reality. 
Taking a look at science, one cannot fall therefore in ab-
solutizing it to reach philosophy, or even, theology. O n e may 
venture to seek an exhaustive knowledge of the material reality 
but it can only remain as such: a knowledge of the material reali-
ty. A n exhaustive knowledge of the universe cannot constitute 
philosophy. N o r does an exhaustive knowledge of phi losophy con-
stitute faith. 
Sanguineti affirms the distinction of science from philosophy 
as fol lows: «.. .the truth of the ph i lo sophy of nature and of 
metaphysics does not lie in an exhaustive scientific knowledge. 
The totality which gives the ultimate perspective to everything 
does not pertain to material principles but to formal or essential 
p r i n c i p l e s . * 4 0 Science is not ph i lo sophy and vice-versa. In the 
same way, phi losophy is not theology and vice-versa. 
One cannot confuse science from phi losophy and phi losophy 
from faith. Science, faith and phi losophy are distinct realities. 
Ph i lo sophy is of another realm that transcends the physical 
without ever abandoning it or be separated from it. Faith is of 
another realm from philosophy that deals with some revealed 
truths of reality that are beyond human reason. It is certain 
though that science presupposes phi losophy but this does not 
reduce it to phi losophy. Phi losophy may presuppose faith but in 
no way can the former be absorbed or be confused with the 
latter. 
It has been seen the relationship between science, phi losophy 
and the doctrine of creation provided by faith in the thoughts of 
Stanley Jak i . Science seeks a knowledge of the universe which can 
only give rise if the real existence of the universe is presupposed 
in philosophy. T h e Christian faith has given to history the fact 
of creation of the universe by a personal G o d who being its 
Ult imate Cause is also its Ult imate Intelligibility. 
It is important to take note however that G o d , being the 
Ult imate Intelligibility of the universe, is not fully intelligible for 
human beings. A s Jaki mentions, full intelligibility is only an in-
sight and not a knowledge of u l t imate intel l igibi l i ty of the 
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universe. G o d is Intelligible in Himself but in no way can human 
beings can comprehend the Ult imate Intelligibility of the universe. 
H u m a n s cannot k n o w G o d as H e is but they can k n o w that H e 
exists and that H e has created the universe by reason. With this, 
they also k n o w that the universe exists and that there is an 
ultimate intelligibility in it. Science, without comprehending its 
u l t imate intel l igibi l i ty, acquires the full intel l igibi l i ty of the 
universe. It was then that science finally succeeded to exist. 
Science is to know, or better, to recognize and accept that there 
is an ultimate intelligibility in the universe. T h e attempt to k n o w 
this ultimate intelligibility, G o d , pertains not to science but to 
phi losophy and theology though only in a partial way. 
Summarizing what has been deduced above from the full in-
telligibility of the universe in science. We have seen the following 
ideas: the full intelligibility of the universe is an affirmation that 
science has some philosophical presupposit ions that point out to 
the totality of the universe (the universe exists) which ultimately 
point out to some theological presupposit ions as well (the universe 
exists contingently and has its ultimate intelligibility in G o d , its 
Creator) ; science is not an absolute knowledge of reality, on the 
contrary, it is only a particular knowledge that relies on some 
presuppositions beyond its scope and is therefore limited, and; it 
expresses as well the mutual relation between science, faith and 
philosophy, that there is harmony and continuity in them in spite 
of being totally distinct f rom one another. 
Before ending this section, it may be convenient to present 
a summary of what has been mentioned in the entire section. I 
deem it necessary for this purpose to cite what Jaki himself has 
written as a summary of a chapter of one of his books that cor-
responds to the ideas contained in this section. H e writes: 
« . . . i t s h o u l d suf f ice t o r e c a p i t u l a t e b r i e f l y the chief 
characteristics of the universe which make scientific w o r k possible. 
First , the material entities observed by science must be real, that 
is, existing independently of the observer. Were not such the case, 
each observer would create his own facts, a result banishing each 
observer to solipsism, the strictest solitary confinement imaginable. 
N o observer reduced to that confinement can lay a claim to an 
exchange of his views with other observers, w h o , at best, are, 
together with their worlds , the creation of his o w n mind. Second, 
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the material entities must have a coherent rationality. They must 
be governed by laws which can be formulated in a quantitative 
framework, and they must have a validity which transcends the 
limit of any particular t ime and location. Third, those entities, 
because they are governed by consistent laws, must fo rm a 
coherent whole, that is, must be subject to a consistent interac-
tion. T h e existence of any material entity which does not interact 
in a coherent way with the known world is utterly irrelevant for 
science. F o r science there is only one universe. Science has no 
room for island universes and multiple worlds if these stand out-
side the realm of physical interaction, be that interaction gravita-
tional, electromagnetic, or of any conceivable kind. Fourth , the 
form in which that coherent wholeness, or universe, does exist, 
cannot be considered a necessary form of existence. It is only one 
among countless others that are conceivable. A s to the question 
why such a universe does in fact exist, science has no answer. It 
cannot even answer the far less deep question whether the dura-
tion of that world is infinite or not. 
These four features of the universe are indispensable not on-
ly f o r m a k i n g t h e n o t i o n of t h e u n i v e r s e w o r t h y o f its 
etymology, the converging of many into unity, but also for mak-
ing science possible. Neither is science conceivable without any of 
them, nor are they conceivable without one another as long as 
one aims at a rational discourse about the universe. Those four 
features form a single basic proposit ion which must be assented to 
unconditionally if any further proposit ion, that is, a message ad-
dressed from one human being to another, is to make sense. A 
proposit ion which demands unconditional assent has since long 
been denoted as a dogma. That basic proposit ion certainly func-
tions as an initial dogma in that superbly articulated creed about 
the reality and rationality of the universe which is science. N o t 
surprisingly, the ultimate justification of that dogma can be found, 
both historically and philosophically, only in that article of faith, 
the dogma of Creation, which is the basis of all genuine and 
reasonable dogmatic p ropos i t ions . * 4 1 
After seeing all these, I will now consider in more detail the 
relationship between science and creation, on how does the notion 
of creation provide for the full intelligibility of the universe, an 
indispensable condition for science. It will be seen that creation 
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implies specificity of the universe and it is this trait of the 
universe that science was made possible. 
2. T H E S P E C I F I C I T Y O F C R E A T I O N A N D T H E C R E A T I O N O F 
S P E C I F I C I T Y 
The universe was created by G o d and H e created it in a 
very specif ic m a n n e r . W h a t is u n d e r s t o o d here as specif ic? 
«Specific» can be understood as follows: «having a special deter-
mining quality; specially or peculiarly pertaining to a certain thing 
or class of things and consituting one of the characteristic features 
of this, and; precise or exact in respect of fulfillment, conditions; 
def inite , e x p l i c i t . * 4 2 What seems t o be the m o r e convenient 
definition of «specific» to be adopted in the context of creation by 
G o d is that of the second, that is, as a characteristic trait proper 
or peculiarly pertaining to a certain thing. 
In the context of a specific creation by G o d of the universe, 
it can be said that G o d created the universe endowing it with 
qualities that are specially characteristic of it. It can be said 
therefore that the universe is specific because it was created. T h e 
inverse of this statement can also be validly said: the universe was 
created because it is specific. Specificity of the universe and its 
createdness point to one and the same thing: a personal Creator , 
absolutely free and rational. 
G o d is absolutely free in creating the universe. There could 
be no other reason why the universe was created aside from the 
will of G o d . A n d G o d , being rational, also created the universe 
rationally, that is to say, creating every reality according to a 
specific manner of being and infusing in it a rationality in the 
form of a rational order that governs the dynamism of the entire 
universe. 
It is by virtue of the rational order in the universe that one 
sees in its dynamism purpose and causality. With the order, pur-
pose and causality in the universe, the universe behaves in a 
specific manner and not in any other way. Besides, every created 
reality is specific in itself by being what it is and only what it 
is according to its essence. F o r this reason, some special qualities 
that are particularly proper of the universe can be attributed. 
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2.1 . The notion of specificity 
Specificity can be attributed to the universe in two ways: 
first, in its dynamism or in its operations; second, in its static 
dimension or in its nature insofar as things are specific in its 
qualities by its essence or form. However , both specificities of 
rea l i ty are c o m p l e m e n t a r y . T h e u n i v e r s e is spec i f i c in its 
dynamism because, in the first place, its essence is specific. 
Essence can be considered as nature or as form. Essence as 
nature is essence as the principle of operation; essence as form, is 
essence as principle of determination. The universe is specific in 
its dynamic aspect because of its nature; it is also specific in its 
static aspect because of its form. 
It is now convenient to point out the relationship of the no-
tion of specificity with other notions related to it to be able to 
understand it better in content and in extent. 
Specificity implies in the first place the creation and the con-
tingency of the universe. Creation is a determination and bestowal 
of the act of being of every created reality. It is for this reason 
that a rational order exists in the universe and it is not chaotic 
though it may seem to be. B y being created, it is also contingent. 
It is by being contingent that it is specific. T h e specificity of the 
universe is said to be specific insofar as its specificity is not by 
itself but by another . Its speci f ic i ty is cont ingent and not 
necessary in absolute terms. 
Being contingent, the universe can be something else but 
G o d has determined it to be what it is in creation. It is con-
tingent but not absolutely chaotic. It is also specific. There exists 
a rational order in it. With a specific order, there is purpose and 
causality in the changes that occur in the universe. T h e universe 
is intelligible because of the specific order in it. A s it has been 
discussed in the preceding section, it is fully intelligible on ac-
count of an ultimate intelligibility that points to G o d as its 
Creator. 
Another derivation from the specificity of the universe is its 
singularity. It is by being specific that the universe is singular. A s 
J ak i writes: «Singularity diffuses through all things in such a man-
ner to turn them into a universe of beings that interact with one 
another in a invariably consistent and most specific m a n n e r . * 4 3 
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The universe is singular, or in other words , unique because there 
exists a single purpose or order, a single rationality that governs 
all the causalities that occur in it. 
Singularity though does not mean homogeneity of all created 
reality in the universe. It is meant as uniformity in the plurality 
or complexity of the universe. The universe is comprised of a 
great number of components . Yet in spite of the complexity of 
the plurality in the universe, it is most singular. There is only 
one universe: this universe. All created reality in the universe 
follows a specific course in their mutual interactions. A single 
order or rationality is obeyed by all in spite of its diversity. It is 
in this sense that the universe is singular. Regardless whether G o d 
had created other universes aside from the universe we know, it 
is certain that this particular universe we live in is specific and 
most singular. 
Still another derivation would be simplicity. Being singular 
and specific, the universe can be said to be s imple. A great 
number of constituents interplay with one another producing a 
many diverse causalities and yet, one discovers that in all these in-
teractions there lies simplicity. All these interactions point out to 
that specific and singular order that governs the universe. 
Specificity, singularity, simplicity, contingency and creation 
are therefore closely knit with one another. What binds them all 
together is the intelligibility of the universe which, in the long 
run, has its cause in an ultimate intelligibility that, though does 
not pertain to the universe, is within the reach of the human 
mind. This ultimate intelligibility is G o d , the personal Creator of 
the universe. 
2.2. Specificity in science 
The universe is specific in the same way that it is singular, 
s imple, contingent and created. All these characteristics point out 
to the fact that G o d has created the universe. In creating it, G o d 
has created it with an order and intelligibility that is founded 
ultimately, in Himself. A s what has been mentioned earlier, the 
universe is specific because it is created and it was created because 
it was specific. 
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It is the specificity of the universe that Chesterton had in 
mind when he wrote the following words : «The world must be 
some shape, and it must be that shape and no other; and it is not 
self-evident that n o b o d y can poss ibly hit on the right o n e . » 4 4 
Chesterton was totally convinced that the universe has a shape 
and not only that. It was also evident for him that the universe 
has a particular shape. This conviction is based on his belief of 
the specificity of the universe that is rooted in the belief of the 
creation. 
Jaki likewise affirms that the universe is specific based on 
his philosophical and theological convictions. H e writes: «...in the 
actual physical world specificity is the hallmark not only of each 
and every par t but a l so of the ir to ta l i ty , the u n i v e r s e . * 4 5 
Moreover, he also claims that specificity is attested by science. It 
is now the purpose to touch on his discussions on the specificity 
of the universe. 
In spite of the evident complexities of the universe, modern 
science is proving that behind those complexities lies the simplici-
ty of the universe. A s J ak i observes:«As physics forges ahead, the 
physical world not only reveals more and more of its grandiose 
unity of plan, but it also gives us a closer glimpse of the stagger-
ing dimensions of its complexities. Past successes of science, of 
course, give strong support to the view that the human intellect 
will be able to cope with these complexi t ies . * 4 6 
Modern science is tending towards more simple and general 
equations that reflect the universe at a larger scale. Advances in 
science seem to disperse the mystery of the complexity of the 
universe. Scientific equations have become more comprehensive 
and yet more simple. There seems to be a clear trend that science 
goes into the direction of simplicity and specificity. J ak i remarks: 
«Whatever true progress has been made in the history of science, 
it was always an advance from one stage of specificity to a stage 
where things appeared even more speci f ic . * 4 7 In another occasion, 
Jaki affirms: «The more genuine success claimed by science, is the 
more specific the universe will appear. O f course, any aspect of 
ordinary reality is very specific, specific to the point of being 
queer . * 4 8 
Science attests the specificity and simplicity of the universe. 
This is particularly true even in the fields of microphysics (quan-
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turn p h y s i c s ) and m a c r o p h y s i c s ( s c i ent i f i c c o s m o l o g y or 
astrophysics). N o t only in the field of «day-to-day» mechanical 
physics does the specificity of the universe is demonstrated . 4 9 
It is indeed quite evident that the universe is specific in 
terms of ordinary physics. That the sun rises at the east and sets 
at the west, that a moving body tends to maintain in mot ion 
while static bodies tend to be at rest, that what goes up goes 
down: all these indicate the specificity of nature, that physical 
observable processes occur fol lowing a specific order and are 
governed by strict rules that dictate the outcome or the result of 
such occurences. 
Stanley Jaki also asserts that even in the level of molecular 
particles and in the level of cosmic bodies, the specificity of the 
universe is demonstrated. T h e nuclear spins, the 2 . 7 ° K cosmic 
background radiation, the quantum physical constants, the equa-
tion E = mc2 of Einstein, etc. indicate that the universe is specific 
in nature. T h e same specificity can be seen in the microlevel and 
macrolevel of the physical universe. Jus t as things observe a 
specific order in ordinary physics, so do molecular particles and 
cosmic bodies. All physical bodies observe an order and follow a 
specific p u r p o s e . 5 0 
Some irregularities may occur in the universe but this does 
not oppose the specificity of the universe. The universe is con-
tingent and is therefore fallible. Hence , one can affirm the ex-
istence of chance but this topic will be seen later on in the next 
section (§ 2.3). 
Science attests the specificity of the universe. However , the 
specificity of the universe is not given by science. It is only given 
to science. Science only discovers the specificity of the universe. 
This implies two things: first, that the universe is objective and 
that there exists absolute truth in it; and, ultimately, these point 
out to the contingency of the universe and the affirmation of G o d 
as its Creator. 
Jaki studies the science of Planck and Einstein —two of the 
greatest modern scientists— to prove his claim. H e observes that 
both affirm a creative science, that which for J ak i implies belief 
on the real and objective existence of the universe and on its con-
tingency. It is a science then that cannot be a priori but on the 
other hand, a posteriori in its attempt to get in touch with reali-
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ty . M o r e o v e r , it is a v iew of real i ty and its specif ic i ty as 
something independent of the human subject although it can be 
k n o w n by h im. It is a science that is opposed to radical a 
priorism of subjectivism adopted by sensationism, rationalism and 
idealism. 
J ak i cites the creativeness of Planck as fol lows: «...it is 
therefore possible for man to reach conclusions through pure 
specu la t ion about t h o s e regular i t ies (...) the external w o r l d 
represents something independent of us, something absolute which 
we c o n f r o n t s 5 1 F o r Jaki : «(Planck's) conception of the world in 
which all p roces se s , forces and factors e m b e d d e d in nature 
reflected one basic unchangeable law, independent of the scientist's 
culture and habitat. The world presupposed by science had to be 
one, consistent throughout, and objectively ex i s t ing . * 5 2 
In the case of E i n s t e i n , J a k i a l so o b s e r v e d the s a m e 
creativeness. F o r him, Einstein also affirmed an objective and ex-
istence of the universe. T h e relativity theory is a misnomer. H e 
writes: «His two theories were in a sense mislabeled with the 
word «relative» because both the special and general theories of 
relativity were more absolutist in character and content than any 
other scientific theory. Their starting point was not a positivist 
aggravation with experimental incongruities, but a burning desire 
to safeguard the beauty of nature and of laws which reflected that 
beauty . » 5 3 
In effect, through Einste in ' s relativity theories he made 
manifest «that the specific form of that order could not be derived 
a priori if the need for experimental verification was to retain any 
meaning. Einstein the philosopher-scientist, perceived that such a 
train of thought was not only a road of science but it also came 
dangerously close to turning at the end into a way to G o d . N o 
wonder that he hastened to make it clear that he had not fallen 
into the hands of pr ie s t s . * 5 4 
In another occasion, Jaki writes on Einstein: «...the true 
phys iognomy of (Einstein's) creative science lies that those prin-
ciples had to relate to an objectively existing totality of things, or 
the universe. Such a universe was not the creation of the mind, 
nor could its high degree of order be expected a priori . T h e 
orderly world was something g i v e n . * 5 5 
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The specificity of the universe as demonstrated by science 
has led to the so-called the anthropic principle which is now 
widely accepted by men of science as well as a number of 
philosophers. This principle states that the universe has evolved in 
a very specific manner that on account of its extreme specificity, 
it is inferred that only in such a universe could man arise, a being 
more specific or peculiar than the universe itself.56 
In effect, the anthropic principle, in the words of Haffner, 
«has put cosmic evolution on a very narrow track and (thus) the 
impossibility for the universe to have an evolution other than it 
had. The universe «had a very narrow escape in order to become 
what it actually is» ( JAKI , S.L., Angels, Apes and Men).» Haffner 
concludes then that «the cosmos seems indeed to have been made 
for man.» 5 7 
Jaki remarks on the anthropic principle: «At any stage, the 
slightest departure from the specificity would prevent the 
emergence of man and the formation of galaxies. This is the con-
sideration which made so many cosmologists speak of the an-
thropic principle. The principle stands for the nagging suspicion 
that the universe may indeed have been fashioned for the sake of 
man. Clearly, cosmologists are, in the grip of a meaning which 
stretches from the universe to man and from man to the universe 
and beyond.» 5 8 
Yet, some deny the anthropic principle and that the 
universe is specific. There are several variations of this denial: 
some, in denying this trait so proper of the universe advocate 
chance as the governing principle of reality (this will be discussed 
in the next section, cfr. § 2.3); others, though they do not deny 
that the universe is specific, maintain that specificity is merely 
quantitative, a view that falls short of real specificity and, as will 
be discussed now, is a terrible blunder as in denying completely 
the specific character of the universe. 
The universe may be said to be specific because it may be 
finite. Being finite, it is limited in quantity. Physics may therefore 
assent to the fact of the specificity of creation. However, what has 
to be referred here is much more than physical specificity. Thus, 
though the universe were not finite as what some physicists 
presume, specificity should still be affirmed.59 
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To affirm solely the physical specificity of the universe falls 
short of real specificity according to Jaki. Though it is certainly 
a step towards that specificity, one should venture that leap 
towards a more radical specificity and not remain in the physical 
quantitative specificity by giving exclusive attention to the realm 
of quantities. The specificity of nature is not only quantitative but 
it is also specific in its features. 
As Jaki points out: «One should not, however, think that 
man's scientifically reliable mental grasp of the totality of matter 
is possible only if that totality is finite. That grasp has for its real 
target the specificity of matter as it exists, a specificity which is even 
more striking for an infinite amount of matter conceived in a 
distribution amenable to scientific treatment* 6 0 (italics mine). The 
specificity that has to be attributed to the universe then should 
not only be in terms of quantity, that is, in terms of its 
finiteness. On one hand, human understanding should grasp that 
the universe is specific in its features, the most basic of which is 
its existence. 
It is necessary then to leap towards that metaphysical 
specificity of the universe. The universe is specific quantitatively 
may be certain but it is also specific in other terms that physics 
cannot account for. How can physics explain the specificity of the 
order in the universe? that is, to explain the question why this 
order and not a different one. As Jaki remarks: «that simplicity 
(of order) would not lack stark specificities which then would 
provoke the question why those specificities are of this and not 
of some other magnitude.* 6 1 This specificity escapes the reach of 
physics and should be attributed to another realm aside from the 
physical. 
Jaki reasons out that since physics can only deal with shapes 
or quantitative specificities, it cannot account for the specificity of 
the universe on its own. If it is ever valid to talk about quan-
titative specificity, it is only from the point of view of the 
metaphysical specificity. The latter accounts for the ultimate 
specificity of the universe. It is for this reason that Jaki adds that 
no such quantitative specificity exists on its own and that he 
writes: «the quantitative specificity of a particular state (or phase 
or shape) of matter can be traced only to another state no less 
specific in its quantitative characteristics.*62 
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The quantitative specificity is ultimately based not in quanti-
t y but in s o m e t h i n g w h i c h m e t a p h y s i c s p r o v i d e s for . T h e 
physical, or the material, is always characterized by unspecificity. 
J ak i expresses this idea with the following: « A universe, which 
science shows to be real and specifically so , will not fail to point 
beyond its specific phases to an origin which has to be a factor 
metaphysically beyond the un iver se . * 6 3 H e goes on to say the 
alternative if only the quantitative specificity is affirmed: «The 
alternative is to be trapped in regress to infinity and to use the 
word universe without meaning by it the very totality of con-
sistently interacting t h i n g s . * 6 4 
In another occasion, he writes: «The cosmologist disdainful 
of metaphysics will be left with a formidable if not frightening ar-
ray of singularities, and the only scientific thing he can do about 
them is to trace them to another array of singularities, a most 
satisfactory and safe pastime as long as one remains oblivious to 
the fallacy of infinite regres s . * 6 5 With these words , Jaki insists 
on leaping beyond the quantitative specificity of the universe and 
look for its ultimate specificity in metaphysics. 
T h e universe may be quantitatively specific but it is not the 
radical specificity that it has. Ult imately, a step has to be taken 
t o w a r d s that radical spec i f ic i ty that can be e n c o u n t e r e d in 
metaphysics. T h e specificity of the universe has to point out to 
the ontological existence of reality and to the acknowledgement of 
a Creator as J ak i realizes. H e writes: «The pr imary purpose of the 
specificities of things is not to make possible mere quantitative 
games with them, but to help one recognize the very reality of 
things and the Reality that makes them rea l . * 6 6 
Still, some insist on avoiding that metaphysical leap that Jaki 
talks about on the specificity of the universe. They affirm that the 
universe is homogenous and perfectly symmetrical . F o r them, 
specif icity is equated wi th h o m o g e n e i t y and s y m m e t r y . T h e 
equality would «provide a semblance of 'perfect' symmetry or 
homogeneity that in turn might seem to dispose of further ques-
t ions that are t r o u b l e s o m e for being p la in ly m e t a p h y s i c a l . * 6 7 
Against this claim, Jaki argues that nature is not simple in a 
trivial sense. It is simple in a sense that «an all-pervading unifor-
mity underlies the manifold complexity of natural phenomena as 
they appear to the ordinary observer . * 6 8 
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The simplicity then which the universe is characterized is 
not homogeneity but an uniformity in the complexity. O n e such 
complex i ty is a slight a s symetry , a very specific imbalance , 
demonstrated by science. A n example of an assymetry in the 
universe is the proton-antiproton imbalance. Matter can only exist 
if there is such imbalance on particles and antiparticles. If there 
were homogenei ty or perfect symmetry , those particles would 
have continually annihilated one another and matter would never 
have exi s ted . 6 9 J ak i writes about this specific imbalance in the 
universe as follows: «All these «cosmic imbalances* attest that the 
universe is a mos t specific entity l imited to a relatively few 
possibilities. Even more important, over such a universe there 
looms the enormously high probabil ity of its not being at all in 
the very f o r m as w e k n o w i t . » 7 0 T h u s , a l though science 
manifests a certain imbalance this imbalance is still specific. Being 
specific, it also calls for something, which is m o r e than the 
physical, that accounts for this specific imbalance in the universe. 
Being specific, it calls for more than the phys ica l . 7 1 
It has been expounded above the arguments on the specifici-
ty of the universe. The universe, from its microlevel up to its 
macrolevel, follows a specific order and purpose . T h e quantitative 
specificity of physics is not adequate to explain this particular trait 
of the universe. O n l y by proceeding to what lies beyond physics 
can the specificity of the universe be fully and truly explained. 
D e n y i n g this s tep, one is led to an infinite regress as J a k i 
remarks: «Those unwilling to admit cosmic contingency can, for 
a while, take refuge in the dream that has regress to infinity as 
its cherished ob jec t . * 7 2 
Specificity does not only concern with quantity but, first 
and foremost, it concerns with the very reality of things, that is, 
its existence and its existence due to a Creator. O n l y then that 
the universe will not appear as nebulous and proper of science. 
Jaki affirms: «...even in its earliest stages the universe was what a 
universe had to be: a most specific totality of all things that, 
because they were things, could only be speci f ic . * 7 3 T h e universe 
is specific, first and foremost, because they are things, that is, they 
form part of creation. O n l y then that the universe is indeed 
specific. Again, we see the connection established by Jaki between 
science, phi losophy and natural theology. 
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2.3. Specificity and the forms of reality 
The universe is specific not only quantitatively as it has 
been argued in the preceding discussion but also in its features. A 
certain specificity is admitted in science but only in terms of 
quantity which cannot account for the real specificity of the 
universe unless one transcends quantity and the physical realm 
and affirm an ontological or metaphysical specificity. 
O n e thought that denies completely specificity is to advocate 
chance as the governing principle of reality. This will now be the 
topic of the discussion. It will be seen that though chance may 
be attributed in the universe, no absolute chance can exist. The 
existence of the forms of reality points out to the specificity of 
the universe that leaves no possible r o o m for absolute chance in 
it. 
O n e thought that advocates chance as the governing princi-
ple of reality, and therefore denies the specificity of the created 
universe, is evolut ionism. There are several degrees in which 
chance and purpose are considered in it. Thus , evolutionism has 
branched out into several forms. Some advocate a moderate evolu-
tionism, a movement that started as a reaction to the rigidity of 
the teleology of old but did not fall into the extreme of denying 
any purpose in reality. Others were led to adopt a radical stand 
of evolutionism that denies any purpose and order in reality. This 
radical stand that considers pure chance is unacceptable in science. 
Science cannot be governed by pure chance. A s Jaki writes: 
«That nothing happens by accident, —that is, by sheer chance, 
that is, really without a cause— is also a chief tenet of science 
about the material universe. F o r if anything were truly accidental, 
there could be no consistency, and without consistency there 
could be no l a w s . » 7 4 Without consistency, no order could be 
established. All would be pure whim. Science could not possibly 
thrive at this intellectual inconsistency. 
It is certain that the universe is intelligible because there is 
order, determination in its causality, in it. But it is also certain 
that chance and indeterminism also exist in the universe. These 
are not incompatible as Artigas remarks: «The principle of causal 
determination does not exclude the existence of a certain margin 
for indétermination in the natural processes of the universe. There 
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is an indéterminat ion in the perfection of an operat ion and 
another in the possibility of a defect in i t . » 7 5 This indétermina-
tion is attributed to the contingency of the universe, that is, G o d 
its Creator and its Ult imate principle of causality, has created it 
in H i s own ways. 
Artigas, like Jaki , conceives chance from the point of view 
of the contingency of the universe, that is, f rom the consideration 
that G o d created the universe in a specific form but also in a con-
tingent manner. By being contingent, the universe is defective. It 
is for this reason that chance exists in the universe. Nevertheless, 
the chance that exists in the universe does not escape the Pro-
vidence of G o d , its Creator , and is therefore specific. Jaki would 
call this as a designed and purposeful chance. Artigas writes: 
«. . . from the point of view of the supreme causality of G o d , 
nothing happens in the world in a casuality. N o t h i n g falls beyond 
the Divine Providence. The casual event can be referred to as a 
proximate contingent cause . » 7 6 
Chance is not incompatible therefore with the specificity of 
the universe. Things may happen by accident in the universe but 
it cannot be affirmed absolutely that these events happen irra-
tionally. «The existence of chance is not irrational (...) It only im-
plies that the order in the universe is compatible with disorder, 
that is, that the physical world is contingent: some events could 
not have happened and others, on one hand, could have happen-
ed. T h e u n i v e r s e a d m i t s in its c o u r s e a great n u m b e r of 
possibilities, several particular possible order and not only a single 
predetermined o n e . » 7 7 
W h a t chance o n l y imp l i e s is the c o n t i n g e n c y of the 
universe. It does not imply the negation of the specificity of the 
universe and its rationality, order and intelligibility. The universe 
is contingent and for this reason there exists in it a necessary be-
ing that accounts for its contingency. G o d , as its Creator and Pro-
vidence, provide for the universe its intelligibility —its full in-
telligibility as what Jaki claims— in spite of its apparent disorder 
and irrationality in some cases due to its contingency. 
Being specific, things that happen by chance are rational. 
These chance events are rational in a sense that they are directed 
towards a finality. They are directed towards a finality because 
there is also causality in them. It is in the finality and causality, 
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though contingent, where its specificity l i e s . 7 8 A s Art igas ex-
plains: «Chance calls for the existence of a previous order of be-
ings endowed with potencies and directed to some ends. T h e fact 
that some events came out 'by chance' does not mean that they 
have occured only by virtue of chance. O n the contrary, these 
events proceed from contingent and potential causes that did not 
have to be actualized necessarily. In the same manner, chance does 
not imply a total absence of finality but only the existence of a 
contingent finality that is open to several poss ibi l i t ies . * 7 9 
Summarizing this discussion on chance in the universe, one 
can make the following conclusions: 1) Chance implies causality as 
Artigas comments : «If chance means «an event without cause* , 
one has to affirm that it does not exist and that it is reduced to 
human i g n o r a n c e . * 8 0 2) Thi s causality is attributed to a con-
tingent cause which, by being contingent, is open to several 
possibilities that do not have to be actualized necessarily and is 
not restricted therefore to a specific and determinate order. It is 
in this sense that chance m a y seem irrational and contradicts the 
specificity of the universe. 3) Lastly, all causality in the universe, 
even the contingent ones, are directed towards G o d , its Ult imate 
Cause. It is for this reason that the irrationality that appears in 
chance is o n l y apparent since it has its ra t ional i ty , and its 
specificity, in G o d . As Artigas writes: «The order that exists in 
contingent causes, that is, in chance is also a marvellous order. 
The ultimate cause of this order can be found in a superior In-
telligence (God) w h o has bestowed such contingent order with all 
its poss ibi l i t ies . * 8 1 
A certain chance or chaos may therefore be admitted in the 
universe but it has to be taken under the right context. It cannot 
be denied that chance exists in the universe. This is evident from 
the fact that there is also indeterminism in it. Chance and indeter-
minism go hand in hand. This indeterminism in chance m a y give 
the impression that the universe is not specific. But it only points 
out to its contingent nature. Being contingent, the universe is also 
specific. Specificity and contingency are mutually related. T h e 
universe is specific because it is contingent, that is, created by 
G o d and it is contingent because it was created by G o d in a 
specific manner. This will be seen later on in the next section 
(cfr. §2.4). 
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N o w leaving behind the discussion on chance and going back 
to the main discussion of this section on the specificity of the 
universe, it has been argued that chance exists in the universe and 
that evolutionism has the right to affirm it. Evolut ionism has cer-
tainly grasped that «the teleology of old, with its almost invariable 
and always unfortunate ties to the fixity of each species, had too 
many pointers toward purpose , which like so many trees could 
obliterate the vision of the fores t . * 8 2 T o o much insistence on pur-
pose in the universe may obscure, as Jaki says, the vision of the 
forest. O n e danger that could present is to attribute purpose to 
all and in all as in Greek panteleology. F r o m this posture, one can 
easily lose track of the right way and be converted as a pantheist 
who considers the universe as self-governing and necessary. 
Contrary to the «teleology of old», one should affirm chance 
in the universe. It should only be since the universe is contingent 
and being contingent, there does not exist a perfect and ideal 
order and determinism in it. It is for this reason that chance ex-
ists in the universe. A s Artigas claims: «Chance implies a defective 
or contingent causal process that lacks an immediate finality. In 
the physical world , there does not exist a perfect and ideal order 
as it was usually adopted in classical physics. O n the contrary, 
there exists a contingent order, a disorder, that is a relative priva-
tion of order in the universe . * 8 3 
Jaki also explains what it is to accept chaos or chance in the 
universe. H e writes: «The only kinds of chaos which are helpful 
to science are forms embodying singular specifics expressive of a 
design which in turn points to p u r p o s e . * 8 4 A designed and pur-
poseful chaos: that is what it has to be. A chaos that is present 
in the changes that occur in the universe —however chaotic these 
changes may be— is founded on the coherence, on the design and 
purpose that accompany these changes. 
Coherence, design and purpose : these are some pointers that 
no absolute chaos can possible exist. Absolute chaos is erratic, 
vague and unintelligible. O n the contrary, the universe, in spite of 
its complex i ty and apparent myster iousness , points to its in-
telligibility and specificity. N o w we will venture to take a look 
at the principle of specificity of the universe. A s what will be 
seen, the principle of specificity of the universe are the forms of 
reality. 
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The form is what makes an existent to be what it is. The 
matter is the indeterminate principle that receives the form. Mat-
ter and form constitute the hylemorphic composit ion of reality ac-
cording to the aristotelian doctrine. It is only of interest in the 
present discussion to consider the forms of reality which, by be-
ing that principle that makes an existent to be what it is, is said 
to be the principle of the specificity of the universe . 8 5 Being the 
principle of specificity, the forms express design and purpose in an 
apparent chaos in the universe. These forms are the basis of 
coherence of reality. Forms , coherence and specificity: all these three 
notions are mutually related. 
Some views that deny the existence of forms are empiricism, 
physicalism and mechanism. These views of reality look at the 
created universe as a mere conglomeration of sensible properties that 
are not founded on any coherent base. A real entity is considered 
here as a jigsaw puzzle consisting of various pieces joined together 
but no principle of unity or coherence is attributed to it what-
soever. Mot ion or change takes place as a variation of those pieces 
or properties. What exists here are sensible properties. Things do 
not exist at this framework. What is left out here is the existence 
of things. 
Against this view, one may argue that change is not a mere 
variation of properties. It may certainly accompany some modifica-
tions in its physical properties but not all of it changes. There re-
mains something that does not change. Things exist and things 
change. Reality cannot be made up solely of physical sensible pro-
perties that change. Aside from the sensible properties, reality first 
and foremost is real, that is, it exists in a very determinate way. 
As Artigas writes: «no existent is a mere collection of properties 
and that an existent has to be real and a determinate manner of 
being; the classical definition of form expresses b o t h . » 8 6 
Besides, there is a principle that dictates the nature of change. 
This principle is geared towards a specific nature. It dictates the 
specific manner of being that delimits the change that could take 
place in reality. Reality can certainly change but it can only change 
according to what it is, that is, according to that principle which 
is expressed by the classical notion of form. 
It is precisely through forms that the world of change secures 
the coherence and permanence needed for a scientific investigation 
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and philosophical interpretation. It is through forms that coherence 
is given in all changes in reality. It is what gives specificity to reality 
making that reality what it is (the essense as form) and it is also 
what gives specificity of purpose in change. Through the forms, 
reality changes only in accordance to what it is and thus, it changes 
coherently. 
A s it has been said earlier, only with the specificity or 
coherence of change can knowledge of the universe is possible. Be-
ing the principle of the coherence of change in the universe, one 
can see that forms are relevant in science and in the knowledge 
of the universe. Artigas takes note of this. H e remarks: «The con-
cept of form is rooted with the intelligibility of nature since it 
represents those dimensions that refer to the manner of being of 
natural existents .» 8 7 
The classical definition of knowledge or intelligibility as the 
intentional or immaterial possession of forms proves the relation-
ship between forms and the intelligiblity of reality, between forms 
and its specificity. It is through the possession of forms that one 
knows the universe. O r , in other words , the intelligibility of the 
universe is contained in the forms , that which establish the 
coherence and specificity in the things themselves and in the change 
of things. 
It is also important to take into account, though by now it 
should appear obvious, what Artigas also observes with regard to 
forms: « T o affirm that existents do not vanish in pure flux of ac-
cidental changes and that they are intelligible, it is not necessary 
in any way to affirm the eternity of the f o r m s . » 8 8 T o affirm 
forms, one has to consider that they are contingent, that is, created 
by G o d otherwise one falls to Plato's eternal forms. T o affirm that 
they are necessary is to affirm likewise that the universe is necessary. 
But it has been repeatedly argued that to fall into this conclusion 
is to get rid of science. Essences, or forms, are contingent as all 
other created reality. This leads the discussion on contingency. 
2.4. Specificity and contingency 
N o w let us take a look at specificity and contingency. As 
it has been mentioned, the universe is specific because it is created 
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and that the universe could only be created —and not something 
that came into existence by pure chance or by other similar 
reasons that do not affirm a personal Creator— because it is seen 
to be specific. A consequence of this is to affirm the relation 
specificity and contingency of the universe. If the universe is 
specific, it can only be created. It can only be contingent and not 
necessary. Specificity implies the contingency of the universe. 
Hint s have been made of such relation in the previous 
paragraphs. That the forms of reality establish the coherence or 
specificity of the changes in reality, that these forms are con-
tingent and that the specificity of the universe points out to a 
more radical specificity than the physical quantitative specificity: 
these statements on the specificity of the universe give w a y to its 
contingency as well, that is, the existence of G o d w h o created the 
universe in a very specific manner. In other words , the ultimate 
consequence is to affirm a free and rational Creator , absolutely 
free from all necessity even from the very specificity of creation. 
H e could have created different specificity from that which is pre-
sent in the universe. It is of interest now to spell out the relation-
ship between these two particular traits of the universe and to 
derive some possible conclusions related with the discussion. 
Science attests the specificity of the universe (cfr. § 2.2). In-
directly but necessarily, it also attests its contingency. It is by be-
ing contingent that the universe is specific. However , the inverse 
of this statement is also true: it is by being specific that the 
universe is contingent. A s J ak i claims: « . . .modern science also 
shows the universe, (...) to be exceedingly specific in its totality 
as well as in its very constituent particles and forces. Such a 
specific universe reveals its contingency by its being limited to a 
specific form of physical existence (and) that specific form of ex-
istence certainly cannot be taken, on scientific grounds, for a 
necessary form of existence. T h e specificity of the universe, which 
is an evidence of its reality, is also the evidence of its contingen-
cy, namely, that it is but one of many possible universes .» 8 9 
In another occasion, J ak i manifests the relationship between 
specificity and contingency. H e remarks : « N o w if an infinitely 
perfect Being is postulated as the creative cause of the universe, 
then his choice must have built-in consistency. A true G o d cannot 
play dice with the universe by changing its laws, its parameters, 
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at the spur of the m o m e n t . » 9 0 Specificity and contingency, con-
tingency and specificity: one points out to the other, that to af-
firm one is to affirm as well the o ther . 9 1 
Being specific, the universe could be different f rom what it 
is, that is, that there exists other possibilities aside from what it 
is. A s J a k i c o m m e n t s : «L ike any specific thing, the specific 
universe, too , has to be the result of a choice among a great 
m a n y p o s s i b i l i t i e s . » 9 2 Be ing a cho ice a m o n g a great m a n y 
possibilities, «the specificity of the universe will remain the kind 
of specificity which keeps reminding any sensitive mind that it is 
not a necessary but a contingent feature, a specificity which does 
not have its raison d'etre in itself, but must depend on a choice 
external to the universe .» 9 3 Thus , specificity implies the affirma-
tion of G o d , that is, the contingency of the universe . 9 4 
T h u s , J ak i writes : «Specificity is the basic and essential 
guidepost toward two fundamental philosophical points . O n e is 
that things can be recognized as real insofar as they are specific 
(...) The other is that next to being a pointer to reality, specificity 
is also the mark of its contingency, that is, a disclosure of the fact 
that it could have been o t h e r w i s e * 9 5 (italics mine). 
The specificity of the universe is therefore contingent. It 
could have been otherwise as Jaki affirms. However , there may be 
a confusion equating specificity and necessity. Being specific, it is 
certain that it has to be what it is necessarily. But in no way does 
it mean that it is necessary as opposed to being contingent. 
H u m a n s realize that the universe is specific because it points out 
to an absolute necessary being w h o has created it in a very 
specific manner, that is, it points out to its contingency. The 
specificity of the universe cannot otherwise be contingent. J ak i ex-
presses this as follows: «The view given by science about the 
universe is a very special view. In that view, the universe appears 
to be a most peculiar, most specific entity. Being very specific, 
(...) it reveals that it could be different from what it is. In other 
words , specificity always reveals the non-necessary character of a 
thing or anyth ing . * 9 6 
H u m a n s are n o t o n l y m e r e s c i e n t i s t s b u t are a l so 
phi losophers to realize that the specificity of the universe is 
necessari ly cont ingent . A s J a k i r e m a r k s : « M a n has to be a 
philosopher to realize that if a thing is found to be what it is, 
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because it was produced by another specific thing or state of af-
fairs, the point of contingency has thereby been pushed only one 
stage back. A s a good philosopher, man will realize that there is 
only a limited number of such stages available in a universe 
limited to one overall specificity which reveals its cont ingency . * 9 7 
A necessary specificity, something that happens for example 
in affirming solely the physical quantitative specificity of the 
universe, is untenable from the point of view of science. Being 
necessary, it would imply that no ultimate intelligibility could be 
found in the universe, that is, that the knowledge of the universe 
would imply a knowledge of an infinite regress. O r , in other 
words , a necessary specificity of the universe would imply that 
the universe itself has its own explanation, that it would only be 
self-explanatory. At this situation, there could be no science and 
no true knowledge of the universe could be achieved. 
Specificity then has to be contingent. The universe is specific 
not because it could not have been otherwise, that is, necessary; 
but because it is contingent, that it could be perfectly otherwise. 
It is specific because there is an absolutely necessary Being in 
Itself that has determined a specificity for the universe. With the 
specificity of the universe, a certain necessity has been introduced 
but a necessity that is not necessary in itself but in another. 
Neither it is true that the universe is pure contingency in 
a sense that it could be different from what it is by itself and in 
itself. This would be equivalent in affirming absolute chaos in it. 
A certain necessity has to be affirmed in the universe. It is a 
necessity of a specificity which in itself is not necessary. O n l y in 
this sense can the specificity of the universe be understood as 
necessary: the necessity of a non-necessary specificity or as a 
necessity in another, in G o d , the absolute necessity in Itself. 9 8 
The question therefore why it is as it is and w h y it exists 
at all is a «metaphysical question about the existence of a Creator 
who , by choosing one specific world , decides w h y the world 
becomes what it is, which is the reason why it exists at a l l . » " 
Specificity is very much linked with contingency. T h e recognition 
of science of the specificity of the universe opens the path 
towards the road to the existence of G o d . As J ak i remarks: «(The 
specificity) which is the hallmark of the cosmos both in its entire-
ty and in all its details calls for a Being capable of an act which 
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is creative in the strictest sense. Such an act implies a selection 
demanded by the singularity of the actual cosmos , one of the in-
finitely many worlds that are conce ivable . * 1 0 0 
Men of science, in their knowledge of the universe, at times 
are faced with the question: «Why it is as it is and w h y it exists 
at all?» The question is quite relevant in their scientific endeavour 
to know the universe. Discoveries were made and explanations 
were given to the why and how of things but they realized that 
there was still s o m e t h i n g m o r e than that . Sc ience o p e n s a 
p a n o r a m a that leads to another d imens ion : the metaphysical 
dimension which offers a more comprehensive view of the uni-
verse. 
Specificity and contingency cannot be limited to science: 
both are philosophical as well. A s Jaki states: «The contingency 
of the universe is a philosophical and, indeed, very metaphysical 
topic (...) (that provides) the kind of understanding that can 
only be had if it is possible to do metaphysics, that is, to go 
beyond the entire physical realm, or the universe, without leaving 
it physically that possibility is the very condition of true meta-
physics . * 1 0 1 
A true metaphysics however according to Jaki is a realist 
metaphysics, a metaphysics that looks at the real and objective ex-
istence of the universe independent of the human mind. This 
points out to the doctrine of creation, a truth that opens to the 
acceptance of G o d the Creator who bestows existence to creation. 
It is in this sense that Jaki stipulates: «. . .man's science is not only 
a view of the universe but also a view of creation and that 
ultimately we have to begin with G o d . » 1 0 2 
Against this view, there are some who insist on denying 
anything related with metaphysics and much more with anything 
related with ' theology' , that 'confusion' between science and faith 
(cfr. § 2.2). In this attempt, they «speak of their urge to construct 
an all-encompassing physical theory which, because of its beauty 
or simplicity, makes the universe appear self-explaining.* 1 0 3 But 
as Jaki observes that many times «such is their excuse, steeped 
more in rhetoric than in logic, not to look for a cause of the 
universe . * 1 0 4 
Science attests specificity; and specificity, contingency. As 
Jaki insists: «The contingency of the universe as a whole serves as 
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a pointer to an ultimate intelligibility which though outside the 
universe in a metaphysical sense, is within the inferential power 
of man's intel lect . * 1 0 5 
In another occasion, he writes: «(The specifity of the universe) 
is a gigantic springboard which can propel upward anyone ready 
to exploit its metaphysical resilience and catch thereby a glimpse 
of the Ult imate and Absolute in the form of a unique inference. 
Catching that glimpse is always transitory. O u r need and hunger 
for the sensory quickly pulls us back to things tangible which, when 
properly touched, will again propel our minds toward the Absolute 
as the explanation of what is singular and cont ingent . * 1 0 6 
H u m a n s can k n o w G o d , the Ult imate Intelligibility, and 
humans, being scientists, have to admit that the universe is specific 
and contingent and that G o d has a role in science. 1 0 7 Jaki affirms 
both science and G o d , two realities that are not contradictory. 
Haffner comments on the role of G o d in science from the 
point of the contingency of the universe. H e writes: «The Chris-
tian concept of G o d ' s freedom to create was therefore, as J ak i 
argued, a stimulus for scientific investigation of contingent scien-
tific laws, namely only one among an infinitely large number of 
possible sets of laws. Clearly, Jaki argues that monotheism, or its 
doctrine of creation, implies a world that has to be investigated 
in a non-apriori m a n n e r . * 1 0 8 
T h e ultimate reason then for the specificity of the universe is 
G o d ' s freedom in creating it. The question then of w h y such and 
not something else is answered by G o d . A s Haffner writes: « . . .God 
is free not to have created anything. G o d could have created the cos-
mos otherwise and that therefore the world could have taken on any 
number of possible forms. Thus the present particular form is highly 
specific, differing from other possible forms of the c o s m o s . * 1 0 9 
Jaki strongly defends that the roads of science lead to the ways 
of G o d . H e claims: «That (a non-metaphysician cosmologist) arrives 
at a metaphysical conclusion (that the product of creation is 
singularity) on the basis of this appreciation of science, which is 
a singularly specific discourse about a bafflingly singular existence, 
should surprise only those unmindful of the very same logic which 
directs the road of science no less than the ways to G o d . » 1 1 0 
F o r Jaki , venturing the road of science, that human under-
taking to k n o w the universe, one is led to discover that reality 
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is not only the entire universe, that reality is much more than the 
physical sensible quantity. O n e is led still to a wider perspective 
of reality that includes the physical but transcends it as well to 
a non-physical aspect of reality. In this amplified view of reality, 
the universe is now seen to be specific and contingent that 
ultimately points out to G o d , its Creator . 
3. C O N C L U S I O N S 
Stanley J a k i argues the phi losophica l presuppos i t ions of 
science. O n e of these presuppos i t ions is the creation of the 
universe by a Rational Creator which m a y be called the on-
tological presupposit ion of science. 
This presupposit ion implies the rationality of the universe, 
that there is an order in it that though contingent is rational and 
very specific. This calls for a creation by G o d w h o being its 
Creator is the Ult imate Intelligibility and not only its Ult imate 
C a u s e . Af f i rming G o d as the U l t i m a t e Intel l igibi l i ty of the 
universe being its Ult imate Cause, the universe can be considered 
as fully intelligible. It is in this perspective that faith and science 
are mutually related in the thoughts of Stanley Jak i . H e proves 
the intimate relationship between them considering the history of 
science, and in particular, the «scientific abort ions* in all predomi-
nant cultures in antiquity due to a philosophical-theological error 
in the way of looking at the universe that resulted to a non-
contingent view of it; and, its viable birth in the Middle Ages 
thanks to the Christian dogma of Creat ion that provided the ade-
quate cosmovis ion and the proper intellectual context in the at-
tempt to k n o w the universe. 
Affirming the creation of the universe by G o d leads to the 
following conclusions: its real existence which is the root of its 
full intelligibility, its specificity and its contingency, and the im-
possibility of pure chance as the governing factor in the changes 
that occur in it. These are the basic ingredients provided by the 
ontological presupposit ion of science that made possible the birth 
and progress of science according to Stanley Jak i . 
The main conclusion that can be derived from the considera-
tion of creation in science is that science is not absolute. It is 
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limited to the material realm. However , reality does not only con-
sist of the material realm. T h e non-material realm of reality is 
considered in science through its presuppositions. Science though 
limited is the door to other realms of reality. 
In doing science and affirming its presupposit ions, one also 
discovers the richness of human nature, that humans are not only 
scientists but they are also philosophers and believers. In effect, 
humans can k n o w the universe and what lies beyond it and can 
also have faith and have a personal relationship with G o d . 
Thus , a second principal conclusion is the mutual relation-
ship between science, faith and philosophy. Such relationship can 
be said to pertain to human nature. Faith and reason form a uni-
ty and continuity of knowledge that, though being distinct and 
autonomous in a certain sense, one co-implies the other. 
This topic of faith-reason relationship has been dealt with 
ex tens ive ly m a n y t imes b y different au thor s f r o m different 
perspectives. What is original in Stanley Jaki is in adopting the 
point of view of the real course of the history of science in show-
ing the relationship between them. It is not the concern of 
Stanley Jaki to define an exact relationship between faith and 
reason. H e only argues the mutual link in their frameworks and 
he does this through history, and more concretely, through the 
history of science. Faith and reason are intertwined in human ex-
istence throughout history and this is particularly true with regard 
to the birth and progress of science. 
It seems to me that J ak i could be misinterpreted as a zealous 
apologist of the Christian faith who confuses faith from reason in 
his discussions of their mutual relationship. It is necessary to exert 
some effort to understand his point of view and take him in his 
real context. If not , one may think that he is being too dogmatic 
and very narrow in his perspectives. But the contrary is closer to 
the truth. In fact, what J ak i pretends to in his works is an open-
ness to reality that considers its totality. H e is notorious for his 
campaign against any reductionist point of view of reality. Hi s 
main concern is how to safeguard the totality of reality. H e does 
this by focusing his attention to the fact of human existence, and 
more concretely, to the fact that humans do science. 
Faith and reason then are mutually related in the considera-
tion of human history and human existence. Historical facts and 
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scientific findings go hand in hand to point out to faith. Jaki ad-
mits that the link is established by phi losophy but perhaps some 
philosophical arguments may be lacking in his arguments. It is for 
this reason that Artigas and Sanguineti have been widely cited to 
supplement or back up the arguments of J ak i which, as it has 
been said, consist mainly of historical facts and arguments that are 
scientific in nature. 
There is no doubt that J a k i has a certain domin ion of 
philosophy, especially of history of philosophy, as it can be seen 
from his works . Yet, he falls short of philosophical arguments in 
his d i scus s ion on fa i th-reason re l a t ionsh ip . N o t cons ider ing 
phi losophy in depth to prove his claim, some think that it is a 
drastic step to take to j u m p from science to the knowledge of 
G o d , that is, some doubt the validity of his natural theology. 
The reason why Jak i does not concentrate in phi losophy is 
a personal matter. Hi s style of doing phi losophy is by history. 
«Teach with examples* , he says. Hi s tory is phi losophy teaching 
with examples. J ak i admits the limitations of this manner of doing 
phi losophy —he admits as well that his specialty is history of 
science— and yet, he opted more for effectiveness. H e deems that 
through examples and historical facts, he can convey better his 
ideas on the phi losophy of science. 
In spite that philosophical arguments are lacking in Jak i , his 
reasonings are consistent. H e openly wages war against those w h o 
fall into scientism or reductionism. What seems to be surprising 
is the silence that reigns in the opposite camp. They never dare 
to attack and question him in the same line of reasoning because 
they cannot find any loophole in it. Most often his critics invoke 
the name of science to prove Jak i false and yet, it seems that they 
could not do so successfully. M a n y times, their arguments consist 
of speculations that have no real solid basis at all. Jak i is confi-
dent that they could never disprove his claim. H i s confidence on 
the truth —which is ultimately rooted in God— serves as his 
defense . O n the c o n t r a r y , m a n y of his w o r s t enemies are 
agnostics, those who do not have faith in the truth on G o d . 
Their resistance may perhaps be the result of some prejudice more 
than rational conflict. 
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NOTES 5 1 7 
8 5 . For a brief reference of matter and form, I quote Artigas* definitions. Ar-
tigas defines matter as «las condiciones espacio-temporates en las que se 
despliega el dinamismo natural (...) más que un tipo de «entidades» ese con-
cepto designa unas «condiciones» materiales, espacio-temporales, desde los 
átomos hasta el hombre.» (ARTIGAS, M . , CyF, p. 1 7 9 ) . On one hand, he 
describes form as «...la forma se refiere al «modo de ser». Todas las en-
tidades, e incluso las propiedades y los procesos, tienen un modo de ser. 
La forma no es una parte de las entidades naturales: es su modo de ser pro-
pio. En el mundo material, la forma no es una entidad subsistente, pero 
es algo real, como lo es el modo de ser de las entidades. Expresa que las 
entidades poseen un ser real, y que ese ser se realiza según un modo de 
ser concreto.» (ARTIGAS, M . , CyF, p. 1 8 6 ) . 
8 6 . ARTIGAS, M . , L D N , p. 3 3 9 . 
8 7 . ARTIGAS, M . , L D N , p. 3 4 0 . Although he only mentions here that forms 
are conceptual, he affirms its real existence, though not on its own, insofar 
as they are basic aspects of existence. He writes: «...las formas naturales son 
materiales porque existen en condiciones materiales. Las formas indican una 
cierta inmaterialidad en cuanto expresan dimensiones ontológicas o modos 
de ser que no se agotan en la pura exterioridad.» (ARTIGAS, M . , CyF, p. 
179 ) . 
8 8 . ARTIGAS, M . , I D N , p. 3 4 3 . 
8 9 . JAKI , S.L., G & C , p. 5 3 . 
9 0 . JAKI, S.L., Teaching Transcendence in Physics, in O C E , p. 2 0 8 . 
9 1 . However, these two notions are not synonymous. Haffner distinguishes 
them as follows: «The quality of specificity lies at the level of the relation-
ship between matter and form, while the quality of contingency concerns 
the level of the connection between essence and existence. The road of 
contingency is therefore one which cannot be traversed by science alone: 
the use of philosophy is required. In particular, the key step in this road 
is the Thomistic principle that the existence of beings grounds knowledge 
(Cfr. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16 , art.l).» (HAFFNER, P . , CSC , p. 9 5 ) . 
9 2 . JAKI, S.L., Thomas and the Universe in «The Thomist» 5 3 ( 1 9 8 9 ) p. 5 7 1 . 
9 3 . JAKI, S.L., The University and the Universe, in CoR, p. 1 9 3 . 
9 4 . Another quotation that shows the relationship between specificity and con-
tingency is the following: «...since the universe is the totality of things, the 
choice for its specificity can only be looked for 'outside' that totality 
where only God can be found.* (JAKI, S.L., Thomas and the Universe in 
«The Thomist* 5 3 ( 1 9 8 9 ) p. 5 7 1 ) . 
In another occasion, Jaki expresses the same idea: «..the reality of the 
universe, if physically real must have a shape, the very pointer to its reali-
ty. Shape in turn means limitation. The real universe, being an overall 
limitation, provokes the classical question of metaphysics: why such and 
not something else? The question is the question about contingency, which 
means not haphazardness or chance but the ontological quality of being 
contingent, that is, dependent on a choice outside the entity in question. 
Since in this case the entity is the universe or the totality of things, the 
choice can be referred only to God, the sole entity 'beyond' all things.* 
(JAKI, S.L., The Only Chaos, in O C E , p. 11) . 
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9 5 . J A K I , S .L . , SSc , p . 197. 
96. J A K I , S .L . , God and Man's Science, in A B R , p . 66. 
97. J A K I , S .L . , G & C , p . 56. 
98 . J a k i insists that cont ingency does not necessari ly m e a n aff irming chance . 
O n the other hand, it invokes the creative act of G o d . H e writes : « . . .con-
tingent qualifies an occurrence as dependent o n s o m e t h i n g that is not 
k n o w n at the m o m e n t . In this condi t ional sense it is all t o o often impl ied 
that the cond i t ion can never be ascertained. H e n c e an event is cont ingent 
w h e n it happens w i t h o u t a ' k n o w n ' cause ; hence the equat ing o f con-
t ingent events w i t h chance or for tu i tous events that are all t o o often taken 
for events out s ide a causal chain . C o n t i n g e n t can , however , also m e a n the 
dependence o f someth ing on a free choice . T h u s the universe is said t o be 
cont ingent o n accout of its utter causal dependence o f the free creative act 
of G o d . » ( J A K I , S .L . , The Cosmic Myth of Chance, in O C E , p . 24) . 
99 . J A K I , S .L . , G & C , p . 9 5 . 
100. J A K I , S .L . , R S G , p . 279 . 
101. J A K I , S .L . , G & C , p . 84. 
102. J A K I , S .L . , God and Man's Science, in A B R , p . 67 . 
103. J A K I , S .L . , G & C , p . 89. 
104. Ibidem. 
105. J A K I , S .L . , R S G , p . 38. 
106. In o n e occas ion , he r e m a r k s : « T h e createdness of everything , or a created 
c o s m o s , p r o v e d t o be the best assurance for the cohes ion of all and for 
their be ing o n essential ly the s a m e level. T h e oneness of that level assures 
the oneness o f all laws o f phys ic s and their universal val idi ty t h r o u g h o u t 
the c o s m o s . » ( J A K I , S .L . , The Hymn of the Universe, in O C E , p . 243) . 
107. H A F F N E R , P., C S C , p . 107. 
108. Ibidem. 
109. J A K I , S .L . , R S G , p . 278 . 
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